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ABSTRACT
Modern power distribution systems are incorporating Phasor Measurement Units
(PMUs) to measure the instantaneous voltage and current phasors at different
nodes in the power grid. These PMUs depend on Global Positioning Systems
(GPS) for precise time and synchronization. However, GPS civil signals are vul-
nerable to external attacks because of its low power and unencrypted signal struc-
ture. Therefore, there is a need for the development of attack resilient GPS time
transfer techniques to ensure power grid stability.
To counteract these adverse effects, we propose an innovative Multi-Receiver
Direct Time Estimation (MR-DTE) algorithm by utilizing the measurements from
multiple GPS receivers driven by a common clock. The raw GPS signals from
each receiver are processed using a robust signal processing technique known as
Direct Time Estimation (DTE). DTE directly correlates the received GPS signal
with the corresponding signal replica for each of the pre-generated set of clock
states. The optimal set of clock candidates is then determined by maximum like-
lihood estimation. We further leverage the known geographical diversity of mul-
tiple receivers and apply Kalman Filter to obtain robust GPS timing.
We evaluate the improved robustness of our MR-DTE algorithm against ex-
ternal timing attacks based on GPS field experiments. In addition, we design a
verification and validation power grid testbed using Real-Time Digital Simula-
tor (RTDS) to demonstrate the impact of jamming, meaconing (i.e., record-and-
replay attack) and satellite data-level anomalies on PMUs. Later, we utilize our
power grid testbed to validate the attack-resilience of our proposed MR-DTE algo-
rithm in comparison to the existing techniques such as traditional scalar tracking
and Position-Information-Aided Vector Tracking.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
Synchronized phasor measurements when incorporated into the real-time control
of power grids, will play an important role in maintaining the overall stability of
the network power system [1, 2, 3]. Thus, the voltage and current phasor mea-
surements are required to be monitored at high frequency and precision to ensure
power grid stability.
Modern power systems deploy Phasor Measurement Units (PMUs) as they pro-
vide highly synchronized measurements in regard to the current state of the sys-
tem [4]. Improving the security of smart grid against cyber attacks has become an
important research topic in the power community [5]. In addition to cyber depen-
dency, the operation of PMUs greatly relies on precise time-keeping sources, such
as Global Positioning Systems (GPS) signals for timing and synchronization [6].
However, traditional GPS signals are unencrypted and susceptible to external
interference [7], either natural or man-made, such as multipath, jamming and
spoofing attacks [8]. Therefore, there is a need for the development of robust
GPS time transfer techniques to ensure power grid stability.
Most of the timing systems output either a 1-PPS (pulse per second) signal or
an IRIG-B (Inter Range Instrumentation Group) time code. 1-PPS signal provides
a precise reference timing at the start of every second and an IRIG-B time code
provides both time and date information [9]. Phasor measurements are recorded
for stability analysis using the corresponding timing signal generated from Coor-
dinated Universal Time (UTC) time obtained from the GPS receivers.
The IEEE C37.118 Standard, “Synchrophasors for Power Systems” is for eval-
uating the robustness and stability of the power grid setup [10]. This standard
evaluates the Total Vector Error (TVE) which can be defined as the vectorial dif-
ference between the measured and expected values of the phasor for any mea-
surement at any given instant. The quantity TVE depends on three parameters:
magnitude, timing and phase angle. In accordance with the IEEE C37.118 Stan-
dard, without any timing and magnitude errors, phase angle error of 0.573◦ which
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corresponds to a 1% TVE, is the maximum allowable TVE. This phase angle er-
ror is equivalent to a timing error of 26.5 µs which is used as a benchmark in
significant number of studies on stability analysis [11, 12].
The hazardous impact of GPS timing attacks has recently gained worldwide
attention due to the successful spoofing of an $80 million yacht, demonstrated
in [13, 14]. Furthermore, real-time tests have been conducted to demonstrate the
vulnerability of PMUs to GPS spoofing attacks [15] and corresponding detection
of presence of attacker using antenna arrays [16].
Atomic clock is one of the alternate sources for supplying timing to PMUs
essentially due to its high precision and low drifting rate. However, a regular
atomic clock is costly and large in size and weight. A more affordable option
is to combine GPS with a chip scale atomic clock (CSAC) as implemented in
[17]. CSAC provides stable timing with drifting rate less than 30 ns/hr, is light
weight and compact in size [18]. However, CSAC combined with GPS can only
address jamming attacks which cause low signal-to-noise ratios of satellites or
loss of satellite lock. However, during a more sophisticated timing attack such as
spoofing, this approach fails to provide required protection.
In addition, an active research area is in developing a low-cost record and replay
prototype using Universal Software Radio Peripheral (USRP) for use in academia
as an experiment platform [19, 20]. One of the important aspects of our work
involves offline experimental verification and validation of our robust time trans-
fer technique using USRP by introducing emulated timing attacks in the signals
transmitted by the device [21].
There have been a variety of algorithms developed to enhance the GPS tim-
ing robustness. Previously developed techniques in our group include Position-
Information-Aided Vector Tracking (PIAVT), which was proven to be effective
in detecting external malicious attacks like jamming, spoofing, etc. [22]. In ad-
dition, Multi-Receiver Position-Information-Aided Vector Tracking (MR-PIAVT)
was developed and discussed in [23] which improves the robustness of the system
by taking into account additional baseline information.
Our current work is an extension of our earlier work on single receiver Direct
Time Estimation (DTE), whose ability to detect meaconing attacks at an early
stage and greater tolerance for higher noise levels, such as those during a jam-
ming attempt, has been presented and verified in prior publications [24]. We pro-
pose a Multi-Receiver Direct Time Estimation (MR-DTE) architecture, as each
receiver is affected differently by the timing attacker when deployed at different
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locations [25]. Therefore, achieving geometric diversity.
1.1 Wide Area Monitoring Systems
The power grid accomplishes the tasks of generation, transmission and distribu-
tion of electricity to designated locations through a well established network ar-
chitecture. The supply and demand of electricity need to be balanced at all times
to maintain power grid stability. Nowadays, the nature of power grid infrastruc-
ture is undergoing rapid changes, such as switching to renewable sources, utilizing
digital technology for grid operations and automating the grid for improved grid
resiliency [26].
Figure 1.1: Noted power outages in the past that affected millions of people.
The impact of external factors on the stability of power grids may range from
small local perturbations to large scale blackouts. Fig. 1.1 describes some of the
most noted power outrages in recent history. The first one is the north east USA
and Canada blackout that occurred due to a software bug in an Ohio power sub-
station [27]. About 50 million people were affected and the entire region remained
in darkness for 2 days. The second one occurred in Indonesia due to a transmission
line failure affecting 100 million people [28]. In 2009, another major power black
out occurred in Brazil that affected 87 million people [29]. This was due to heavy
rains and winds that led to a short-circuit. The power blackout in India during July
2012 affected around 670 million people [30]. The weak interlinking power lines
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and the increased power demand from some regions resulted in this largest power
outrage in the word history. Therefore, we can observe that with time, there is an
increase in the population affected by power outages.
In the light of these wide-scale blackouts, Office of Electricity Delivery and
Energy Reliability (OE) has come up with a set of goals [31] aiming to improve
the reliability and robustness of the future power grid. The set of goals are as
follows:
1. Providing synchronized phasor measurements
2. Establishing reliable communication network
3. Monitoring the grid in real-time
4. Automating the power grid control operations
5. Improving the security margins
The focus of this thesis is to obtain synchronized phasor measurements re-
quired to establish reliable real-time network monitoring across various nodes in
the power grid. The term “phasor” refers to a complex quantity representing the
magnitude and phase angle of the voltage and current measurements. Wide Area
Monitoring Systems (WAMS) rely on the modern data acquisition technology of
phasor measurements to monitor the transmission system conditions at various
crucial nodes across the grid [32]. The goal of WAMS is to efficiently detect the
system anomalies and take countermeasures to prevent grid instabilities [33].
Currently, the power system functions are regulated using a control system
known as Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) [34]. SCADA
monitors the phasors across the power grid by polling the measurements once ev-
ery few seconds for critical systems and once every few minutes for non-critical
ones. The state of the power grid is measured through sensors at various nodes of
power grid that are later transmitted to a master control station for stability analy-
sis. Due to the lack of a precise time reference and transmission delays, SCADA
outputs unsynchronized measurements, thereby increasing the complexity of data
analysis and reducing the reliability and robustness of the electricity grid [35].
With the recent development in the technology, advanced devices i.e., PMUs
are being employed for grid monitoring as in Fig. 1.2. PMUs were invented in
1988 by Dr. Arun G. Phadke and Dr. James S. Thorp at Virginia Tech [36].
PMUs are capable of polling up to 60 observations per second. WAMS depends
on synchronized phasor measurements from distributed PMUs. These precise
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phasor measurements are required for high-resolution grid state estimation and
potential early-stage detection of destabilizing conditions [37]. PMUs are critical
for providing quick response to emergencies, preventing disturbance propagation
across grid, limiting the possibility of load shedding and improving the system
restoration time in the event of an instability.
Figure 1.2: Map showing the widespread distribution of PMUs across US.
Due to the high sampling frequency, the PMUs are capable of providing the
control monitoring stations with measurements at subsecond time frame. The
precise PMU measurements are thereby used for real-time state estimation and
control operations required to analyze the stability of the power system. Fig. 1.3
shows the performance comparison of PMU and SCADA devices in the event of
voltage disturbance in a power grid in Oklahoma that occurred on April 5, 2011
[38]. We observe that the PMU provides high precision measurements and detects
the anomaly approximately 30 s prior to the SCADA systems.
Figure 1.3: PMU measurements are denoted by the red line while the SCADA
measurements are denoted by the blue line. In the event of voltage disturbance,
PMU detects anomaly approximately 30 s prior to SCADA.
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PMUs measure current, voltage, frequency and phase angle measurements at
certain given nodes in the power system which are recorded in a data concentrator
at an interval of 100 ms. The dynamic state of critical and non-critical nodes
in transmission and distribution networks is monitored by comparing the PMU
measurement data across the grid. Therefore, a closed loop dynamic monitoring
of critical nodes in power systems is achieved in near future using these high
precision devices.
1.2 GPS timing for PMUs
Given that the power community is transitioning to an automated smart grid in
future, synchronized phasor measurements from PMU are extremely essential for
automated control and stability monitoring. In typical applications, phasor mea-
surement units are sampled from widely dispersed locations in the power system
network and synchronized from the common time source of a GPS radio clock.
Table 1.1 compares the advantages and disadvantages of using GPS for obtaining
precise measurements. GPS provides up to µs-level accurate timing and is free
to all users. In addition, GPS constellation has global coverage, which enables
network-wide stability monitoring of the grid.
Table 1.1: Characteristics of GPS.
Advantages Disadvantages
Global coverage Un-encrypted signal structure
Freely available Low signal power
µs−level accurate time Vulnerable to attacks
On the other hand, given the unencrypted nature and low signal power, GPS
signals are vulnerable to external interference either natural or man-made. The
susceptibility of GPS signals to jamming and spoofing leads to potential vulnera-
bilities in WAMS [39, 40].
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Figure 1.4: GPS timing in PMUs.
1.3 GPS timing attacks and error sources
We classified the sources of GPS threats and errors that affect the accuracy and
reliability as follows: atmosphere (ionosphere and troposphere), user clock errors,
satellite clock bias errors, number of satellites, satellite geometry, multipath and
non-line of sight signals, intentional/unintentional GPS transmission anomalies,
intentional degradation of the satellite signal (such as spoofing, jamming) etc..
Due to the vulnerabilities of the GPS signals explained in Section 1.2, our cur-
rent focus is on jamming, spoofing attacks, satellite broadcast data anomalies and
unwanted external interference.
(a) Jamming attack (b) Meaconing attack
Figure 1.5: Types of timing attacks that affect the robustness; (a) broadcast high
power noise signals in L1 frequency range; (b) record-and-replay of high power
spurious GPS signals.
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1.3.1 Jamming
Jamming is one of the most common mode of GPS timing attack that involves
broadcasting a high-power noise signal in the GPS frequency band as in Fig.
1.5(a). Jamming causes the GPS receiver to lose track of the signal acquired
[41, 42], and ultimately makes the timing information unavailable for the PMUs.
1.3.2 Spoofing
In spoofing, spurious counterfeit GPS signals are transmitted with high power so
as to manipulate the GPS receiver with wrong data as shown in Fig. 1.5(b). In
our work, we focus on a type of spoofing attack known as meaconing, or record
and replay attack. The standard meaconing attack involves collecting the GPS
signals at a different place and different time, and replaying them with increased
power [43, 44]. However, a sophisticated attack involves collecting the signals
at the same place but at a different time. This sophisticated attack deceives the
algorithms that implement a position check.
1.3.3 Satellite broadcast data anomalies
According to GPS design specifications: GPS time is automatically steered to
UTC on a daily basis by the ground control station to keep system time within
one microsecond of UTC time. On a few occasions such as software bugs or
wrong calculations, erroneous data have been transmitted by the GPS satellites
and affected the GPS position and timing accuracy [45, 46].
1.3.4 Unwanted external interference
The GPS community is actively working to prevent the broadcast of high-powered
radio signals in or near L1 GPS frequency band [47]. In addition, the other sources
of external interferences are due to electromagnetic waves [48], solar flares [49]
and certain electronic devices. Since the received GPS signals are of very low
power, the presence of these external unwanted disturbances degrades the GPS
signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) and deteriorates the accuracy.
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1.4 Contribution and outline of this thesis
The contribution of this thesis is in three major aspects:
1. We proposed a novel MR-DTE architecture that utilizes the information
from spatially dispersed receiver locations to improve resilience to noise
and external timing attacks. MR-DTE is an extension of DTE, a robust
signal processing technique that directly operates with timing parameters
and performs non-coherent vector correlation across satellites to improve
the SNR. In addition, we enhanced the computational efficiency of DTE by
incorporating an adaptive covariance based Gaussian search space.
2. We demonstrated the impact of timing attacks and GPS satellite data anoma-
lies on the stability of power grid using Real-Time Digital Simulator (RTDS)
based virtual power grid testbed.
3. We validated the increased robustness of our MR-DTE algorithm as com-
pared to scalar tracking, PIAVT and single-receiver DTE (SR-DTE).
The rest of the thesis is organized as follows: Chapter 2 covers the basics of GPS
and provides an overview of the existing GPS algorithms, namely scalar track-
ing and PIAVT. Chapter 3 describes the importance of GPS timing in PMUs and
the associated GPS timing attacks and other significant error sources. Chapter
4 describes the underlying concept of our efficient DTE based signal processing
technique and our novel MR-DTE architecture. This chapter also provides details
in regard to its initialization and Kalman Filter design to account for multiple
receivers. Chapter 5 outlines the experimental setup for validating our multi-
receiver DTE algorithms. In Chapter 6, we present the impact of GPS satellite
data anomaly, jamming and meaconing attacks on stability of the power grid.
Chapter 7 validates the increased resilience of our MR-DTE algorithm using both
a GPS experimental setup and a virtual power grid testbed. Chapter 8 concludes
the thesis and describes the future direction of our research.
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CHAPTER 2
BACKGROUND OF GPS
Global Navigation Satellite Systems (GNSS) is an integral part of commercial
navigation based applications to estimate the global Position, Velocity and Time
(PVT) information at any location on Earth. In this thesis, we utilize the civilian
L1 signals (carrier frequency of 1575.42 MHz) of the operational GNSS system
of the United States known as GPS [50].
GPS has 3 segments: space segment, user segment and control segment. The
space segment comprises of 24 to 32 satellites in medium Earth orbit at an altitude
of 20,200 km. GPS satellites are strategically placed in 6 orbital planes, such that
a minimum of 4 satellites are available to calculate the navigation solution at any
time and location [51]. The control segment consists of a master control station
(MCS), an alternate master control station, ground antennas and monitor stations.
The user segment includes GPS receivers that utilize the signals broadcast from
GPS satellites to calculate their corresponding locations.
Figure 2.1: GPS signal structure.
GPS satellites broadcast a modulated signal (over a carrier wave) as in Fig. 2.1
which consists of:
1. Pseudorandom code: this is a satellite specific code used to distinguish the
individual satellite signals. It is also used for estimating the time of ar-
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rival (TOA) of the signal in the receiver time scale. They are unencrypted
Coarse/Acquisition (C/A) code which chip rate of 1.023 MHz.
2. Navigation message: this includes the satellite position, satellite clock cor-
rections, UTC corrections, time of transmission (TOT) of the signal, etc.
Each GPS satellite continuously broadcasts a navigation message at a rate
of 50 bits/s.
2.1 Defining the parameters
We consider N satellites in view. The GPS signal replica Y given by Eq. (2.2)
can be represented by 4 signal parameters as follows: carrier frequency f (i)carr and
carrier phase φ (i)code which characterizes the underlying Doppler carrier wave; code
frequency f (i)code and code phase φ
(i)
code which represent the i
th satellite specificC/A
code. In addition, these GPS parameters are also a function of the 3D position and
velocity X , clock parameters T and 3D satellite position and velocity, S(i).
X : Position and velocity of the receiver
= [x,y,z, x˙, y˙, z˙]
T : Clock states of the receiver
= [cδ t,cδ t˙]
S(i) : Position and velocity of the ith satellite
= [x(i)s ,y
(i)
s ,z
(i)
s , x˙
(i)
s , y˙
(i)
s , z˙
(i)
s ]
(2.1)
Y : signal replica of the GPS signal
=
N
∑
i=1
Y i
Y : signal replica corresponding to ith satellite
Y i = Di(t)Gi( f icode(t)+φ
i
code)e
j2pi( f icarr(t)+φ icarr)
(2.2)
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t : time instant being considered
Di(t) : Navigation databit from ith satellite
Gi(t) : L1 C/A code chip from ith satellite
f icode : Code frequency of the i
th satellite signal
φ icode : Code phase of the i
th satellite signal
f icarr : Carrier frequency of the i
th satellite signal
φ icarr : Carrier phase of the i
th satellite signal
(2.3)
fC/A : Chiprate of C/A code, 1.023 MHz
fL1 : Frequency of L1 signal carrier, 1575.42 MHz
fIF : Intermediate frequency (IF), Hz
ECI : Earth-Centered-Inertial
(2.4)
2.2 Traditional approach
Figure 2.2: GPS Trilateration. Reference image taken from [53].
2.2.1 Trilateration
Commercial GPS receivers rely on a technique known as trilateration. In simplest
terms, trilateration involves calculating the intersection point of 3 circles given the
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center and radius as shown in Fig. 2.2. The center of the red circles correspond to
the satellite position Si, the radius corresponds to the distance between the satellite
and the receiver ρ i, and the intersection point is the position of GPS receiver X .
The onboard GPS satellite clocks are not synchronized to the GPS receiver clocks,
because of which there is an associated 4th unknown parameter known as the clock
bias (cδ t). Therefore, at least 4 satellites are required to estimate the navigation
solution.
The pseudo distance known as pseudorange ρ(i) is calculated based on the dif-
ference in the transmit time of the signal from the ith satellite and the received
time at the GPS receiver represented below.
ρ(i) : Pseudorange corresponding to the ithsatellite
= c∗ t(i)travel
t(i)travel : Signal time of flight corresponding to the i
thsatellite
= c(t(i)tx − trx)
t(i)tx : Transmit time of the signal from i
thsatellite
trx : Receive time of the signal at the receiver
Pseudorange is theoretically estimated by modeling the satellite clock errors, re-
ceiver clock bias, atmospheric delays and Gaussian noise as in Eq. (2.5).
ρ(i)=
√
((x(i)s − x)2+(y(i)s − y)2+(z(i)s − z)2+c(Tcδ t−T (i)cδ t,s)+c(T
(i)
T +T
(i)
I )+ε
(i),
(2.5)
where ε(i) is the Gaussian measurement error, cT (i)T is the tropospheric error and
cT (i)I is the ionospheric error.
The information related to satellite position, satellite clock corrections T (i)cδ t,s,
transmit time of the signal are encoded in the navigation message. The decoding
of the navigation message requires the receiver to track the GPS parameters listed
in Eq. (2.3). Once the pseudorange, satellite positions, and satellite clock biases
are known we implement trilateration using least-squares method to determine the
user position and velocity.
Similarly, this can be extended to the velocity domain of the receiver. Here the
pseudorate ρ˙(i) is calculated from the Doppler shifts or the time difference in the
carrier phase measurements. Finally, a complete navigation solution consisting
of 8 (X ,T ) unknown parameters are estimated with a minimum of 4 satellites in
13
view [52]. These unknowns are estimated using least-squares technique whose
equations are formulated by linearizing the Eq. (2.6).

δρ1
:
δρ j
δρN
δ ρ˙1
:
δ ρ˙ j
δ ρ˙N˙

= H

∆x
∆y
∆z
∆cδ t
∆x˙
∆y˙
∆z˙
∆cδ t˙

, (2.6)
where geometry matrix is given by
H =

los(1)x,k los
(1)
y,k los
(1)
z,k 0 0 0 1 0
0 0 0 los(1)x,k los
(1)
y,k los
(1)
z,k 0 1
: : : : : : : :
: : : : : : : :
los(N)x,k los
(N)
y,k los
(N)
z,k 0 0 0 1 0
0 0 0 los(N)x,k los
(N)
y,k los
(N)
z,k 0 1

,
where
los(i)x,y,z : ECI line of sight vector for ithsatellite
=
−(Xx,y,z,ECI−Six,y,z,ECI)
||Xx,y,z,ECI−Six,y,z,ECI||
.
(2.7)
2.2.2 Scalar Tracking
Tracking loops play a critical role in continuously tracking the dynamically chang-
ing code and carrier parameters of the incoming GPS signal. However, the code
and carrier tracking loops of traditional scalar tracking are vulnerable to low SNR
and high dynamics [54].
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Figure 2.3: Flow chart for scalar tracking.
In a traditional GPS receiver, acquisition is done first to determine the satellites
in view and their corresponding initial code phase and carrier doppler frequency
[55]. After the initial acquisition, the scalar tracking loops track the satellite sig-
nals and independently estimate the corresponding pseudoranges. These pseudo-
ranges are then collectively processed to obtain the PVT solution as in Fig. 2.3.
We can observe that in scalar tracking there is no information exchange between
tracking loops and navigation block. Also the conventional scalar tracking ne-
glects the dependencies between the channels based on the same user position
and velocities.
The Numerically Controlled Oscillator (NCO) generates early, prompt, and late
replicas which are used to create correlations with the incoming signals. We will
denote the in-phase early, prompt, and late correlations as IE , IP, and IL. Simi-
larly, quadrature correlations will be denoted as QE , QP, and QL. Given the prior
information about the low dynamic nature of our power grid system, we opted for
carrier frequency and code phase discriminators that are well suited for low SNR
environments, such as interference or jamming [57].
For the code phase discriminator, we opted for the non-coherent early minus
late discriminator, which is given by:
1
2
E−L
E+L
(2.8)
where E =
√
I2E +Q
2
E and L =
√
I2L+Q
2
L. This discriminator is normalized to
remove amplitude sensitivity.
We chose to use a normalized decision directed frequency discriminator, which
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is described as follows:
cross× sign(dot)
2pi(tk− tk−1)(I2k +Q2k)
(2.9)
where cross = Ik−1Qk − IkQk−1 and dot = Ik−1Ik −Qk−1Qk. The error values
obtained as outputs from the above discriminators are then used to generate the
Kalman filter measurement matrix.
2.3 Position-Information-Aided Vector Tracking
Unlike scalar tracking, a vector tracking loop combines the tracking and PVT
estimation blocks into a single loop. Vector tracking enhances performance by
enabling closed loop information flow among satellite channels [56]. For timing
applications, since the receivers are static, receiver position information is pro-
vided to vector tracking, called PIAVT [57].
Figure 2.4: Flow chart for PIAVT.
As shown in Fig. 2.4, the process for the PIAVT contains 3 main blocks [22] as
follows:
1. Scalar tracking: predict the GPS signal parameters using NCO and em-
ploys discriminators to track the code and carrier offsets as explained in
Section 2.2.
2. Kalman Filtering based measurement update: obtain corrected timing pa-
rameters which are given as input to the PMU.
3. PIA and Kalman Filtering based time update: incorporate the known posi-
tion information to correct for the GPS signal parameters, and then predicts
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the timing parameters for the next instant.
2.3.1 Kalman Filtering based measurement update
The code phase and carrier frequency errors are obtained as output from discrim-
inators explained in Section 2.2. The relationship between the code phase and
carrier frequency errors in terms of user position and velocity are written as fol-
lows:
e(i)code,k = φˆ
(i)
k −φ (i)k
= Tb,k+(Xx,y,z,k− Xˆx,y,z,k)T los(i)k
(2.10)
e(i)carrier,k = fˆ
(i)
carrier,k− f (i)carrier,k
= ∆Td,k+(Xx˙,y˙,z˙,k− Xˆx˙,y˙,z˙,k)T los(i)k ,
(2.11)
where e(i)code,k and φ
(i)
k are in m, and e
(i)
carrier,k, and f
(i)
carrier,k are in m/s. Therefore,
in our PIAVT approach, we set the states of the Kalman Filter to be 3D position
error (∆X), velocity error(∆V ), clock bias (Tb,k) and clock drift error(∆Td,k).
Kalman Filter is initialized through the scalar tracking results. Kalman Filter
equations for this case is written as follows:

∆Xx,y,z,(k+1)
∆Xx˙,y˙,z˙,(k+1)
Tb,(k+1)
∆Td,(k+1)
= F

∆Xx,y,z,(k+1)
∆Xx˙,y˙,z˙,(k+1)
Tb,k
∆Td,k
 , (2.12)
where the state transition matrix F is
F =

0 0 0 ∆t 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 ∆t 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 ∆t 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 1 ∆t
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

. (2.13)
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The Kalman Filter measurement matrix is then given by
Zk =
[
e1code,k e
1
carrier,k ..e
i
code,k e
i
carrier,k.. e
N
code,k e
N
carrier,k
]
, (2.14)
where the measurement matrix H is defined as Eq. (2.7).
The corrected predictions are then obtained as output of our vector tracking
loop. Based on this, we calculate the clock bias of the receiver as a weighted
average of the difference between the pseudorange calculated and the range [58]:
tb =
1
σNi=1ωi
N
∑
i=1
ω(i)(ρ(i)−|S(i)−Xknown|), (2.15)
where ω(i) is the weighting term calculated by ω(i) =
1
var(ε(i))
, where ε(i) is
the noise in the channel corresponding to ith satellite, and ρ(i) is the calculated
pseudorange between the PMU receiver and the ith satellite. var(ε(i)) is obtained
from the carrier-to-noise density ratio (C/No) of a particular ith satellite. This
corrected clock bias is then obtained as an output from PIAVT loop, which is then
given as input to the PMUs in power grid.
2.3.2 PIA and Kalman Filtering based time update
Once the position and velocity predictions have been corrected by the Kalman
filter, these corrected predictions are compared with the pre-determined known
3D position and velocity. By taking into account the true position, we can estimate
the corrected signal parameters for the same time epoch using Eq. (2.16).
φ (i)k = φˆ
(i)
k +∆Xx,y,z,k . los
(i)
k + c∆t+Tb,k
f (i)code,k = fˆ
(i)
code,k+(Td,k+∆Xx˙,y˙,z˙,k . los
(i)
k ) fC/A/c
f (i)carrier,k = fˆ
(i)
carrier,k+(Td,k+∆Xx˙,y˙,z˙,k . los
(i)
k ) fL1/c
(2.16)
After this step, these corrected values are used to calculate the timing parame-
ters for the next time epoch. These predicted timing parameters are sent back into
the loop to predict the signal parameters using NCO of scalar tracking loop for the
next time epoch and the loop continues.
18
CHAPTER 3
MULTI-RECEIVER DIRECT TIME
ESTIMATION
3.1 Overview of our algorithm
Our proposed MR-DTE algorithm employs multiple receivers to establish geo-
graphical diversity enabled by the infrastructure of the grid. Fig. 3.1 shows an
electrical power substation in Champaign, Illinois. Given that the power grid is
a static system, the 3D position and velocity of the receivers are surveyed ahead
of time and later used for aiding the fine solution. Unlike scalar tracking, DTE
directly operates with the timing parameters and does not require the estimation
of intermediate pseudorange measurements.
Figure 3.1: Illinois Power Substation, Champaign IL.
All the receivers in the MR-DTE setup are triggered by a common external
clock. Difference in cable lengths introduces a bias across the receivers that needs
be pre-determined. In our setup, the cable length difference across the receivers
is between 1− 2 m. The cable delay difference is much less than the C/A chip
width, thus considered negligible [59]. All the above aspects are adopted to re-
duce the search space from 8L (Xt,k,Tt,k) to 2 (Tt,overall), thereby decreasing the
computational complexity.
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3.2 Architecture of MR-DTE
In our MR-DTE architecture [25], there are L different receivers that receive GPS
signals from N visible satellites at time instant t. The complete state of any kth
GPS receiver is represented by Xk (3D position and velocity) and Tk (clock param-
eters). As shown in Eq. (3.1), the corrected overall clock state vector Tt,overall is
obtained as the output from MR-DTE. This is used to estimate the absolute UTC
time that is used as reference time in PMUs.
L : Number of receivers in MR-DTE setup
k : 1,.., L subscript to denote the kth receiver
Xt,k : 3D Position and velocity of the kth receiver at
tth time instant
= [xk,yk,zk, x˙k, y˙k, z˙k]t
Tt,k : Clock states of the kth receiver at tth time instant
= [cδ tk,cδ t˙k]t
The high level architecture of MR-DTE described in Fig. 3.2 consists of two
major steps. The first step involves applying DTE in parallel to estimate the maxi-
mum likelihood timing parameters for each of the kth receiver. The corresponding
error residuals ek computed from the first step are considered as input for next
step. The second step is the MR-DTE filter. We jointly process the error residuals
from different receivers in an overall filter to account for individual receiver errors
and mitigate the effect of localized malicious signals if any. We define:
Tt,overall : Overall clock state of the MR-DTE setup
: Input to the PMUs in power grid, 2×1
= [cδ toverall,cδ t˙overall],
where
cδ toverall : Overall clock bias of the clock (m)
cδ t˙overall : Overall clock drift of the clock (m/s).
(3.1)
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Figure 3.2: Architecture of MR-DTE.
3.2.1 Characteristics of DTE
DTE which is the first step of MR-DTE, estimates the cumulative satellite vector
correlation of the raw received GPS signal with the signal replica produced for
each grid point g j from a pre-generated 2D-search space consisting of G grid
points [24]. As shown in Eq. (3.2), correlating the incoming GPS signal with a
cumulative satellite signal replica is equivalent to first correlating the incoming
signal with the individual satellite replicas and then summing across the satellites.
For each clock candidate set, we execute the per satellite computations in parallel
which are later aggregated together to establish the final correlation value.
corr j : DTE correlation for the jth clock candidate set
= corr(R,
N
∑
i=1
Y i(cδ t j,cδ t˙ j))
=
N
∑
i=1
corr(R,Y i(g j))
R : Raw received GPS signal
g j : jth grid point in 2-D search space
= [cδ t j,cδ t˙ j]
j : 1.. G subscript denote the jth grid point
(3.2)
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corr-overall =
G
max
j=1
corr j
G : Number of grid points in search space
(3.3)
Figure 3.3: Vector correlation weights corresponding to the 2-D clock state
search space with G grid points. Peak of the bell curve estimated using MLE.
Taking 3D position and velocity of the static receiver as aprior information, the
most plausible clock state of the receiver represented by the peak of the bell curve
in Fig. 3.3, is evaluated using maximum likelihood estimation (MLE) [60].
In the case of weak signal environment, DTE directly focuses on the combined
satellite signal correlation rather than tracking satellite channels independently.
Therefore, DTE is more robust [62] in degraded signal environment and in the
presence of multipath or external timing attacks. DTE achieves equal or better
accuracy compared to scalar tracking. Mathematically, this is justified because
the variance of a one-step estimator is lower than the variance of an estimator
involving multiple steps [61].
3.3 Detailed flow of MR-DTE
The flow chart explaining the first step i.e., DTE is shown in Fig. 3.4 and each
block is explained in the subsequent steps:
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Figure 3.4: DTE.
3.3.1 Vector correlation
Based on the predicted clock state estimate, N satellite positions and 3D position
and velocity of the kth receiver, a composite signal replica is generated for each of
the G grid points considered. First step in the DTE process is to carry out vector
correlations on a per satellite channel basis.
Correlations are performed by correlating the incoming signal with the carrier
signal replica to obtain the variation of correlation amplitude against the code
phase residuals as depicted in Fig. 3.5.
Figure 3.5: Correlation amplitude plotted against the code phase residual.
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Similarly, Fourier transforms are computed by correlating the incoming signal
with the generated code replica and then plotting variation of the spectrum mag-
nitude table as shown in Fig. 3.6.
Figure 3.6: Spectrum magnitude against carrier doppler frequency residual.
The above computations are carried out in two parallel threads as in Fig. 3.7:
one for correlations and other for the Fourier transforms.
Figure 3.7: Correlation amplitude and Spectrum magnitude across satellites
3.3.2 Candidate selection
DTE is computationally expensive given that search space at each time instant
involves G =M2 number of computations, where M denotes the number of pre-
generated clock bias and clock drift candidates each. In order to reduce the com-
plexity, we carry out the search process independently and in two parallel threads.
Keeping the current predicted estimate of the clock drift as constant, clock bias
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residual candidates are evaluated through the first thread. Similarly, second thread
considers candidates of clock drift residuals keeping the current predicted esti-
mate of the clock bias as constant. As shown in Fig. 3.8(a) and 3.8(b), for each
time instant, the number of computations are effectively reduced from G=M2 to
G= 2M.
The accuracy of the solution estimated using DTE depends on the resolution
of the grid points considered. To further improve the computational efficiency
and precision of the clock parameters estimated, we incorporated an adaptive co-
variance based Gaussian search space as seen in Fig. 3.8(c). The search space is
designed based on the predicted covariance values estimated by the time update
of Kalman Filter.
(a) (b)
(c)
Figure 3.8: (a) The original search space for a pre-generated G=M2 grid points;
(b) The modified G= 2M uniform search space; (c) The adaptive Gaussian
search space for computational efficiency.
This split is justified because channel delay is proportional to clock bias and
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Doppler frequency is proportional to clock drift as described in Eq. (3.4)-(3.5).
f (i)code = fC/A+
fC/A
fL1
× f idcarr
φ (i)code =−
fC/A
c
(||Xx,y,z,ECI−Six,y,z,ECI||)
+(Tcδ t−T icδ t)
(3.4)
f (i)carr = fIF + f idcarr
f (i)dcarr : carrier doppler frequency of the i
thsatellite
=− fL1
c
(−losix,y,z.(Xx˙,y˙,z˙,ECI−Six˙,y˙,z˙,ECI)
+(Tcδ t˙−T icδ t˙))
(3.5)
To reduce the computational load, computations of DTE are separated into two
parallel thread. The sets of clock candidates are given below.
∆Tcδ t =

∆cδ t1 0
: :
∆cδ t j 0
∆cδ tM 0
 ,
∆Tcδ t˙ =

0 ∆cδ t˙1
: :
0 ∆cδ t˙ j
0 ∆cδ t˙M
 .
For each candidate residual ∆Tcδ t, j, we compute the corresponding code resid-
ual and map it to the correlation table in Section 3.3.1. The correlation amplitude
corresponding to the code residual is computed for the jth set and for each of the
N satellites. In parallel, spectrum magnitude corresponding to the carrier residual
is generated from the ∆Tcδ t˙, j.
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3.3.3 Non-coherent summation
Figure 3.9: Non-coherent summation of the correlation amplitude ci, j,k across N
satellites to compute the correlation weight wcδ t, j,k corresponding to jth clock
bias candidate ∆Tcδ t, j and kth receiver.
For each jth candidate set, non-coherent summation (i.e., amplitude summation
without considering the phase) of correlation amplitudes ci, j,k and spectrum mag-
nitudes si, j,k is evaluated respectively across the N visible satellites.
In ideal conditions, the correlation peaks across the satellites should correspond
to the same code and carrier residual. However, given the measurement noise, we
observe difference in location of the maximum correlation peak for correlation
amplitude plots in Fig. 3.9 and for spectrum magnitude plots in Fig. 3.10. By
adopting the non-coherent summation based vector correlation, we are essentially
employing a voting scheme wherein each ith satellite votes for the likelihood of a
particular jth candidate error residual set.
Figure 3.10: Non-coherent summation of the spectrum magnitude si, j,k across N
satellites to compute the correlation weight wcδ t˙, j,k corresponding to jth clock
drift candidate ∆Tcδ t˙, j and kth receiver.
The obtained summation of correlation values are allocated as weights for the
next step that performs maximum likelihood estimation.
The weights obtained for each of the clock bias candidates is as follows:
wcδ t, j,k =
N
∑
i=1
ci, j,k, (3.6)
27
where ci, j,k denotes the correlation amplitude obtained for ith satellite, jth clock
candidate and kth receiver.
The weights obtained for each of the clock drift candidates is as follows:
wcδ t˙, j,k =
N
∑
i=1
si, j,k, (3.7)
where si, j,k denotes the correlation amplitude obtained for ith satellite, jth clock
candidate and kth receiver.
3.3.4 MLE
The steps in Sections 3.3.1-3.3.3 are for a particular receiver and candidate set. In
this step for each receiver, MLE is applied across the M candidate sets to estimate
the most likely set of clock residuals.
After obtaining the weights corresponding to the clock candidate sets, a weighted
average as in Eq. (3.8) is performed to come up with the best estimate of the clock
parameters. The measurement error residual obtained in Eq. (3.9) is given as input
to MR-DTE filter.
Tt,k,MLE =
[
∑Mj=1wcδ t, j,kcδ t j,k
∑Mj=1 cδ t j,k
,
∑Mj=1wcδ t˙, j,kcδ t˙ j,k
∑Mj=1 cδ t˙ j,k
]
, (3.8)
where
Tt,k,MLE : maximum likely estimate of the clock state
et,k : Measurement residual for the kthreceiver
= Tt,k,MLE −Tt,overall
= [∆cδ tk,∆cδ t˙k]
(3.9)
3.3.5 Individual measurement update
After obtaining the measurement error vectors ek for each of the individual re-
ceivers, Kalman Filter is implemented to estimate the individual corrected clock
bias and clock drift represented by Tt,k. The measurement noise covariance matrix
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is evaluated by considering the covariance of the last 20 individual measurement
residuals.
The measurement update for kth receiver at any instant t:
Hk : Observation matrix, 2×2
=
[
1 0
0 1
]
Pˆt,k : Predicted state error covariance matrix
Rt,k : measurement noise covariance matrix
=
t−19
∑
i=t
et,k
Kt,k : Kalman gain matrix
= Pˆt,kHTk (HkPˆt,kH
T
k +Rt,k)
−1
∆Tt,k : State error vector
= Kt,ket,k
(3.10)
Tt,k : Corrected state vector of the kth receiver
= Tˆt,k+∆Tt,k
Pt,k : Corrected state error covariance matrix
= (I−Kt,kHk)Pˆt,k
(3.11)
3.3.6 Overall measurement update
In this step, the measurements obtained from individual receivers are processed
using an overall Kalman Filter to account for spurious signals. The measure-
ment residual vector et,overall is obtained by computing the difference between
individual corrected clock parameters Tt,k and the predicted reference state vector
Tˆt,overall .
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The overall measurement update equations at instant t are listed as follows:
et,overall =

Tt,1− Tˆt,overall
:
Tt,k− Tˆt,overall
Tt,L− Tˆt,overall

H : Observation matrix, (L+1)× (L+1)
=

1 1 0 .. 0
0 1 1 .. 0
: : : .. :
0 0 0 1 1

(3.12)
Pˆt : Predicted state error covariance matrix
Rt : measurement noise covariance matrix
=
Rt,1 .. 0 .. 0: : Rt,k : :
0 .. 0 .. Rt,L

Kt : Kalman gain matrix
= PˆtHT (HPˆtHT +Rt)−1
(3.13)
∆Tt,overall : State error vector
: Ktet,overall
Tt,overall : Corrected state vector of the kth receiver
= Tˆt,overall+∆Tt,overall
Pt : Corrected state error covariance matrix
= (I−KtH)Pˆt
(3.14)
The corrected clock parameters (Tt,overall) obtained as output from MR-DTE is
given as input to the PMU. Later, we update the clock parameters of individual
receivers to have same values as the overall state vector.
T t,k = Tt,overall, k = 1, ..,L (3.15)
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3.3.7 Time update
We linearly propagate the clock parameters based on the first order state transition
matrix to predict the overall and individual receiver states for the next time instant
t + 1. The predicted covariance matrix obtained is used for designing the grid
points of clock candidate search space for the next time instant.
The time update equations for the kth receiver are:
∆T : Update interval
Fk : State transition matrix, 2×2
=
[
1 ∆T
0 1
]
Qt,k : State process noise covariance matrix
= Fk
[
0 ∆T
0 (c×στ)2
]
FTk
στ : allan deviation of the front-end oscillator, (s)
Tˆt+1,k : Predicted state vector for the (t+1)th instant
= FkT t,k
Pˆt+1,k : Predicted state error covariance matrix
= FkPt,kFTk +Qt,k
(3.16)
The overall time update equations are given by:
Tˆt+1,overall : Predicted state vector
= FTt,overall
Pˆt+1,overall : Predicted state error covariance matrix
= FPtFT +Qt
(3.17)
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F : Overall state propagation matrix
=
F1 .. 0: Fk
0 .. FL

Qt : state process noise covariance matrix
= F
Qt,1 .. 0: Qt,k
0 .. Qt,L
FT
3.4 Initialization of MR-DTE
Accuracy and convergence of MR-DTE depend on the reliability of known static
position and velocity of receivers, which is computed through the existing GPS
algorithms averaged over time. The static information obtained is used for the
initialization of MR-DTE. In high noise levels conditions, where the position co-
ordinates obtained are not accurate enough, 3D position and velocity of individual
receivers are included in the state vector and simultaneously estimated.
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CHAPTER 4
EXPERIMENTAL SETUP
Our experimental setup consists of two parts: the first part involves collecting
raw GPS signals using multiple receivers. The raw GPS signals are processed
to evaluate the increased robustness of our advanced algorithms namely SR-DTE
and MR-DTE. The second part analyzes the stability of the grid when subjected
to timing attacks using our proposed algorithm in Section 3 as compared to scalar
tracking explained in Section 2.2 and PIAVT described in Section 2.3.
4.1 GPS experimental setup
Figure 4.1: Four GPS antennas located on roof of Talbot Laboratory, University
of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign (UIUC). Reference image taken from [23].
Our proposed algorithms are validated using AntCom 3GNSSA4-XT-1 GNSS an-
tennas [63] mounted onto the roof of Talbot Laboratory, Urbana, Illinois as shown
in Fig. 4.1. They are connected to a common Microsemi Quantum SA.45s CSAC
[64], chosen for its low drift rate.
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Figure 4.2: Data collection for GPS experiments.
The raw voltage data is logged using respective Universal Software Radio Pe-
ripherals (USRP-N210) [65] each equipped with a DBSRX2 daughterboard as
shown in Fig. 4.3. GNUradio [66] was used for collecting the raw GPS L1 signal
samples from USRP at a sampling rate of 5 MHz.
Figure 4.3: Specifications of the daughter boards used with USRP-N210.
Virtual timing attacks are generated and mixed with the signal collected to sim-
ulate timing attack scenarios as in Fig. 4.4. We chose to implement this technique
in the Python based Software Defined Radio (SDR) developed in our lab known
as pyGNSS [67], given its flexible and object oriented framework. In our case,
the 3D position and velocity of the receivers are calculated using Multi-Receiver
Vector Tracking (MRVT) [68]. For the vector correlation, we opted a coherent
integration time of ∆T = 20 ms.
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Figure 4.4: Flow chart explaining the first part of experimental validation. Raw
GPS signals are collected using multiple receivers and processed through SDR
based pyGNSS to generate the corresponding timing signals.
4.2 Power grid testbed
Figure 4.5: Flow chart explaining our power testbed at UIUC. Raw GPS signals
and the corresponding MR-DTE based timing signals are simultaneously
transmitted to analyze the recorded PMU data.
The second part of our experimental validation involves performing offline stabil-
ity analysis of the grid, in the presence of timing attacks using our setup shown
in Fig. 4.5. The upper thread sends the GPS signals to a commercial clock that
in turn supplies the timing signals to a hardware PMU. The lower thread triggers
another hardware PMU using our SR-DTE/MR-DTE based timing. We use Real-
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Time Digital Simulator (RTDS) in Fig. 4.6(a) for simulating wide network power
system.
(a) (b)
Figure 4.6: (a) RTDS; (b) hardware PMU used for the experiments.
Second set of GPS signals are collected on the rooftop of Electrical and Com-
puter Engineering (ECE) building using two receivers as in Fig. 4.7(a). The
datasets analyzed are different from that used in Section 6.1. The collected GPS
signals are re-transmitted as either authentic or malicious signals using the USRP
with WBX daughter board, which is a wide bandwidth transceiver.
(a) (b)
Figure 4.7: (a) GPS antenna setup on ECE building and the satellite signal
strengths; (b) GNURadio software used for record and replay of GPS signals.
Recording and replaying the collected GPS signals cause an additional unknown
frequency offset that is dependent on the accuracy of the reference oscillator.
USRP-N210 has a Temperature Compensated Crystal Oscillator (TCXO) on-board
which provides upto 2.5 ppm3 accuracy [65]. However, this is not sufficient to
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trigger the SEL-2488 satellite synchronized network clock used in our experi-
ments. To account for this, we aid the USRP+WBX with an external 10 MHz
reference clock signal supplied by the CSAC.
These re-transmitted GPS signals are given as input to the commercial GPS
clock (SEL-2488) that provides the corresponding timing signals as output. The
output from the commercial clock is used to trigger the hardware PMU (SEL-421
protection, automation and control system) as shown in Fig. 4.6(b).
The USRP with LFTX daughter board (0− 30 MHz transmitter) transmits the
timing signals produced using MR-DTE. The timing signals follow a standard
protocol for transferring timing information known as IRIG time codes as shown
in Fig 4.8(a). We designed a parser to convert the time obtained from our GPS
algorithms to IRIG-B004 protocol. Manual zero padding is done at the start to
align the raw GPS signals. The output from USRP+LFTX is of 0−1 V , while the
PMU is configured to operate with 0− 5 V input. Therefore, a voltage shifter is
designed to amplify the signal as shown in Fig. 4.8(b).
(a) (b)
Figure 4.8: (a) Basic IRIG-B signal bits; (b) cyan line represents the output from
the commercial clock before voltage shifting, and blue line denotes the output
after voltage shifting.
A MIMO expansion cable is used to synchronize both the USRPs, thereby en-
abling an exchange of clock and time information. GNURadio software is used
for transmitting the synchronized signals in Fig. 4.9 to the USRPs as shown in
Fig. 4.10.
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Figure 4.9: Blue signals represents the timing signals from USRP+LFTX setup
while cyan signals represent the timing signals from USRP+WBX setup.
Figure 4.10: GNURadio program for MIMO setup.
Our hardware equipment with their respective connections is shown in Fig. 4.11.
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Figure 4.11: Our hardware power testbed.
The virtual test case is designed using PMU performance analyzer (PPA) [69]
as shown in Fig. 4.12. PPA is a tool developed for analyzing the performance of
PMU during steady-state and dynamic conditions. Step inputs of 16 units is given
to voltage and 23 units is given to current, while maintaining a constant phase
angle of −89.5◦. The data is collected using OpenHistorian trending tool [70]
and processed in MATLAB [71] to generate the results corresponding to different
experiments.
(a) (b)
Figure 4.12: (a) Underlying virtual circuit to generate the linear step based PMU
testcase; (b) settings for PMU testcase.
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CHAPTER 5
IMPACT OF TIMING ATTACKS AND
ANOMALIES ON POWER GRID
In this section, we demonstrate the impact of timing attacks and GPS satellite
broadcast data anomalies on the grid. According to the IEEE standard for PMU
measurements, without any timing and magnitude errors, the max allowable phase
angle error between two PMUs should not exceed 0.573◦ [11].
5.1 Jamming attacks
To test and quantify the impact of jamming and meaconing on commercial clocks
(in this case, SEL-2488), we conducted experiments using our power testbed. We
supplied one of the PMUs with authentic signals and the other with emulated
malicious signals as shown in Fig. 5.1. Our setup is triggered using RTDS.
Figure 5.1: Setup to demonstrate the impact of timing attacks on the grid. One
PMU is supplied with authentic GPS timing signals, and the other is supplied
with emulated malicious signals.
To evaluate the effect of jamming, we design a GNURadio block code shown in
Fig. 5.3, with a variable noise voltage to be introduced. Fig. 5.2 shows decrease
in satellite signal strengths with increase in noise voltage of the jamming signal
introduced.
Commercial clocks require to detect and track a minimum of 4 satellites with
signal strength more than 30 dB above the noise floor. Based on these conditions,
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a jamming threshold of 11.2 V added noise voltage is computed, above which
sufficient number of strong satellite signals can no longer be tracked and therefore
the GPS timing is no longer available.
Figure 5.2: Variation of satellite signal strength with jamming. The black dotted
line represents the threshold for scalar tracking as it requires a minimum of 4
satellites.
Figure 5.3: GNURadio code to generate added jamming based GPS signal.
5.2 Meaconing attacks
Compared to jamming, meaconing is a more sophisticated and dangerous attack
as it manipulates the PMU with wrong time. To illustrate the impact of meaconing
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attack, we introduce meaconing signals with varying delay and signal strength as
shown in Fig. 5.4.
(a) Timing Signal (b) Timing Signal
(c) Phasor voltage: angle (d) Phasor voltage: angle
(e) Phasor voltage: magnitude (f) Phasor voltage: magnitude
Figure 5.4: (a), (c), (e) plots represent meaconing attack with 4 dB higher power
than authentic signals and a delay of 400 µs; (b), (d), (f) represent meaconing
attack with 4 dB higher power than authentic signals and a delay of 1000 µs.
To compute the dependency of delay introduced by meaconing attack on PMU
phase angle, we designed GNURadio block code to simulate meaconing attacks
as shown in Fig. 5.5. We observe a linear increase in phase angle difference
observed by PMUs, with increase in the delay introduced in Fig. 5.6. Therefore,
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when the current power system is transferred to an automated smart grid in future,
GPS timing attacks will be of high threats to the power grid stability.
Figure 5.5: GNURadio code for generating the meaconing signal.
Figure 5.6: Variation of phase angle difference with delay introduced by
meaconing attack. A linear increase in the phase angle difference is observed
with increase in delay introduced.
5.3 GPS satellite data anomaly: a case study on
January 26, 2016
In addition to the timing attacks namely jamming and meaconing, GPS satellite
broadcast data anomalies also affect the robustness of the WAMS. The impact of
the data anomalies on the stability of the grid is discussed in this section.
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5.3.1 Causes of the anomaly
On January 26, 2016, a temporary error was triggered in the data upload system of
GPS due to the decommissioning of the GPS satellite SV-23 [72]. This anomaly
caused incorrect data to be transmitted from the satellites on the commercial L1
band used by most of the commercial GPS receivers. Satellites reportedly trans-
mitting the erroneous parameters were PRN: 2, 6, 7, 9 and 23.
Figure 5.7: Navigation message structure of GPS signals showing the
information broadcast by GPS satellites.
GPS navigational message as shown in Fig.5.7 contains information of satellite
time of transmission, ephemeris, satellite health, satellite clock correction, prop-
agation delay effects (due to signal propagation in ionosphere and troposphere),
time transfer to UTC, GPS satellite constellation health status. The subframe 4
of the navigation message as shown in Fig. 5.8 transmits the ionospheric correc-
tion parameters, UTC parameters and the almanac data. During the anomaly, the
UTC parameters (tot ,WNt ,A0) decoded from specific affected satellites mentioned
above were wrong.
Figure 5.8: UTC parameters broadcast by GPS satellites.
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The UTC parameters are useful for applications in which synchronization of
time is essential such as in power grids. The relation between UTC and GPS time
is computed as follows:
tUTC = mod((tE −∆tUTC),86400)
∆tUTC = ∆tLS+A0+A1(tE − tot+604800(WN−WNt))
tE : GPS time as estimated by the user
∆tLS : delta time due to leap seconds
A0,A1 : constant and first order terms of polynomial
tot : reference time for UTC data
WN : current week number (derived from subframe 1)
WNt : UTC reference week number
(5.1)
5.3.2 Results and analysis
In this section, different GPS receivers across America are analyzed and the broad-
cast satellite data are compared with the correct ephemeris data to understand the
impact of the GPS satellite data anomaly on different users.
A high-end GPS receiver :
A high-end trimble GPS receiver is mounted on the rooftop of Talbot Labora-
tory at UIUC. This is a highly precise instrument and can give an accuracy of upto
centimeter level. In the table below, the data files of Trimble receiver on January
26, 2016 are compared with that of February 22, 2016.
Table 5.1: UTC parameters decoded by the Trimble receiver on the rooftop of
Talbot Laboratory at UIUC. The parameters decoded on January 26, 2016 show
an error of 13.7 µs
Date UTC.A0 UTC.A1 Tot WNt
February 23, 2016 0 -5.3291e-15 319488 1881
February 22, 2016 3.7253e-09 8.8818e-15 319488 1881
January 22, 2016 -13.696e-06 1.2434e-14 0 0
We observe from Table. 5.1, that an error has been detected by the Trimble
receiver similar to the error reported by various GPS receivers across the world.
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This shows that UTC parameters being transmitted were indeed corrupted.
Continuously Operating Reference Station (CORS):
We considered the stations in Colorado, given that the Master Control Station
(MCS) is located in Colorado Springs. For comparison, the closest CORS network
station (ILUC) to UIUC is also listed [73]. Unlike the broadcast data received by
the Trimble receiver, CORS receivers are referenced to the correct navigation pa-
rameters obtained from International GNSS Service (IGS) network [74]. Instead
of an error of 13.7 µs in timing parameters, we see from Table. 5.2, that the CORS
network is not affected.
Table 5.2: UTC Parameters decoded by CORS receivers. CORS receivers are
referenced to the correct navigation data obtained from IGS network and hence
do not show the anomaly.
Location UTC.A0 UTC.A1 Tot WNt
Cannon City, Colorado 9.3132e-10 5.3291e-15 319488 1881
Pueblo, Colorado 9.3132e-10 5.3291e-15 319488 1881
Urbana, Illinois 9.3132e-10 5.3291e-15 319488 1881
5.3.3 Impact on Power grid
Fig. 5.9 depicts the difference in the position between the case when corrupted
UTC parameters were used to the case when actual UTC parameters were used.
We observe that no significant effect on the navigation solution can be seen. Thus,
the normal commercial users did not face any problem.
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Figure 5.9: Negligible error in navigation solution. GPS satellite data anomaly
does not affect the position calculated. However, we will show in Fig. 5.10 that a
significant error of 13.7 µs is observed in the calculation of UTC time.
The Fig. 5.10 shows the comparison between the two scenarios: One where
the time difference is computed between the original UTC of London and user
calculated UTC from GPS time using correct UTC parameters and the second
case where this difference is calculated using corrupted UTC parameters.
Figure 5.10: Significant error of 13.7 µs in the calculation of UTC time.
To summarize, we see that an error of 13.7 µs does not affect the position
accuracy to a great extent. However, in the case of power grid an error in 13.7 µs
results in a phase angle difference of 1◦ which is a significant error according to
the IEEE C37.118 standard.
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CHAPTER 6
RESULTS AND ANALYSIS
In our verification and validation experiments, attack resiliency of our proposed
GPS algorithms is compared to the existing techniques, such as PIAVT and scalar
tracking. Our analysis is categorized into 3 sections of experiments as follows:
1. GPS field experiments conducted using the setup described in Section 4.1
to analyze the robust competency of our SR-DTE and MR-DTE algorithms
in tracking the GPS signal parameters correctly.
2. Our power testbed experiments to analyze the improved stability of power
grid at the PMU level.
6.1 GPS Robustness Analysis
6.1.1 Single-Receiver Direct Time Estimation (SR-DTE)
We test the performance of SR-DTE as compared to scalar tracking while sub-
jected to external timing attack scenarios.
Jamming
The conditions of jamming are generated by adding an additional white Gaus-
sian noise Ae j2piφ t to the incoming received signal as shown in Fig. 6.1(a). The
noisy jamming signal includes two components: amplitude A which is a measure
of the strength of the noise being introduced and random phase φ . Before the ad-
dition of noise, there is a clear peak as shown in Fig.6.1(a) but after the addition
of 12 dB noise, the peak falls below the noise floor as shown in Fig. 6.1(b).
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(a) (b)
Figure 6.1: Jamming attack effect: (a) Authentic case with distinct peak above
noise floor; (b) 12dB of added jamming case with no distinct peak above noise
floor.
The clock bias and clock drift residuals of SR-DTE are compared with scalar
tracking in Fig. 6.7. For 5 dB of added jamming, the clock bias is less than 25 ns
and clock drift residual of 0.25 ns/s. Furthermore, we observe that even under
12 dB of added jamming, the clock bias residual is less than 150 ns and the clock
drift residual of less than 1.5 ns/s.
(a) (b)
Figure 6.2: Resiliency of SR-DTE with 5 dB and 12 dB added jamming; (a)
clock bias residual; (b) clock drift residual. Even with 12 dB of added jamming,
clock bias residual is within 150 ns and clock drift residual within 1.5 ns/s.
Under an added jamming attack of 12 dB, Fig. 6.3 shows that the scalar tracking
lost the lock while SR-DTE still maintains robust tracking. Additional offline
experiments verified that the SR-DTE algorithm remains robust till 14.2 dB of
added jamming thereby providing 2.2 dB of increased noise tolerance.
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(a) (b)
(c) (d)
Figure 6.3: (a) Carrier doppler frequency residual using SR-DTE; (b) carrier
Doppler residual using scalar tracking; (c) code frequency residual using
SR-DTE; and (d) code frequency residual using scalar tracking. Scalar tracking
loses track at 12 dB of added noise, whereas SR-DTE still remains robust.
Meaconing
In this case, a replay signal with similar GPS signal structure and signal power
2.3 dB greater than the authentic signal is added to the incoming GPS signal. The
first 36 s uses scalar tracking, after which the spurious signal is introduced. At
this point we turn on the SR-DTE algorithm and compare its performance to that
of scalar tracking for the next 30 s.
The correlation plots in Fig. 6.4(b) show the presence of both meaconing and
authentic signals. The meaconing signals which is of higher power than the au-
thentic signals is tracked by scalar tracking thereby estimating wrong time infor-
mation.
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(a) (b)
Figure 6.4: Meaconing attack effect: (a) Authentic case with distinct peak above
noise floor; (b) meaconing case with two distinct peaks above noise floor: one
corresponds to the authentic signals, while the other stronger peak corresponds to
meaconed signal.
(a) (b)
(c) (d)
Figure 6.5: (a) Carrier Doppler frequency residual for SR-DTE; (b) carrier
Doppler frequency residual for scalar tracking; (c) code frequency residual for
SR-DTE; and (d) code frequency for scalar tracking. Scalar tracking locks onto
the meaconed signal whereas SR-DTE maintains lock onto the legitimate one.
We observe in Fig. 6.5 that scalar tracking locks on the meaconing signal and
continues to track the malicious signal while the SR-DTE tracks the authentic
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signal. Our SR-DTE algorithm is able to sustain a meaconing signal with 1.3 dB
higher power than the authentic signals.
6.1.2 MR-DTE
Jamming
In the case of jamming, Fig. 6.6 is indicative of the robustness of the MR-DTE
algorithm. In the presence of 12 dB added noise, the scalar tracking loses track.
However, the MR-DTE continues to track the authentic signal accurately.
(a) (b)
(c) (d)
Figure 6.6: (a) Carrier Doppler frequency residual using MR-DTE; (b) carrier
Doppler residual using scalar tracking; (c) code frequency residual using
MR-DTE; and (d) code frequency residual using scalar tracking. Scalar tracking
loses track at 12 dB of added noise, whereas MR-DTE still remains robust.
In Fig. 6.7, the clock bias and clock drift residuals are compared for added
noise with respect to the signal noise floor. In the presence of 5dB added noise,
the clock bias is estimated with an error of within 10 ns and in case of 12 dB added
noise within an error of 100 ns. The jamming threshold for MR-DTE is calculated
as 17 dB which is 5 dB higher than traditional scalar tracking. Thus a more robust
clock state is estimated by implementing MR-DTE algorithm.
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(a) (b)
Figure 6.7: (a) Clock bias residual comparison for 5 dB and 12 dB of added
noise; and (b) clock drift comparison for 5 dB and 12 dB of added noise. Even
with 12 dB of added jamming, clock bias residual is within 100 ns and clock drift
residual within 1.5 ns/s.
Meaconing
(a) (b)
(c) (d)
Figure 6.8: (a) Carrier Doppler frequency residual for MR-DTE; (b) carrier
Doppler frequency residual for scalar tracking; (c) code frequency residual for
MR-DTE; and (d) code frequency for scalar tracking. Scalar tracking locks onto
the meaconed signal whereas MR-DTE maintains lock onto the legitimate one.
When meaconing signal of 3 dB higher power than authentic signals is added, the
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scalar tracking locks onto the counterfeit signal as shown in Fig. 6.8 whereas the
MRDTE still consistently tracks the authentic signal and mitigates the effect of
meaconing attack.
In accordance with the experimental results shown in Table. 6.1, MR-DTE has a
higher threshold to both jamming and meaconing attacks. Under added jamming,
MR-DTE has 2.8 dB higher tolerance than SR-DTE and 5 dB higher tolerance
than scalar tracking. In the presence of meaconing attack, MR-DTE offers 0.7 dB
more tolerance than SR-DTE and 2 dB more tolerance than the scalar tracking.
Table 6.1: Threshold of various GPS algorithms to timing attacks. Here, the
timing attacks are emulated in pyGNSS. MR-DTE offers higher tolerance to
jamming and meaconing attacks than SR-DTE, PIAVT and scalar tracking.
Algorithm Jamming (in dB) Meaconing (in dB)
Scalar 12 1
SR-DTE 14.2 2.3
MR-DTE 17 3
6.2 Stability analysis of the Power Grid
To validate attack resilience of our multi-receiver setup at the power grid level, we
analyzed the TVE error of PMU by recording the voltage, current and phase angle
measurements. The power testbed described in Section 4.2 is used for conducting
the experiments. In the experiments below, the PMU labelled “GTNET” is the
reference one which always supplies the authentic signals and the PMU labelled
“Double High”is the one attacked by the malicious GPS signals. The experiments
are conducted using GPS signals collected on the rooftop of ECE building and are
different from the GPS signals analyzed in Section 6.1
We calibrated the PMUs to account for any initial offsets in the measurements
recorded. One of the PMUs receives the IRIG-B timing signals generated by sup-
plying authentic GPS signals (using USRP+WBX). Similarly, the other PMU is
triggered using the USRP+LFTX that supplies the authentic pyGNSS based scalar
tracking signals. Based on this, the PMU measurements are calibrated to an accu-
racy of around 0.005◦.
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Table 6.2: Threshold of various algorithms to external attacks. Here, the timing
attacks are emulated in GNURadio. MR-DTE offers higher tolerance to jamming
and meaconing attacks than SR-DTE, PIAVT and scalar tracking.
Algorithm Jamming (in V ) Meaconing (in dB)
Scalar 1.12 1
PIAVT 1.6 1.4
SRDTE 2.1 2.01
MRDTE 3.4 4.2
Jamming
For the jamming case, a 11.2 V added noise voltage is mixed with authentic sig-
nals and the results are analyzed. We observe from Table. 6.2 that MR-DTE has
higher threshold to jamming which can be verified through Fig. 6.9. In the case of
jamming, the GPS timing information is unavailable for one of the PMUs because
of which the voltage and current measurements recorded are zero while the phase
angle fluctuates randomly.
(a) Phasor voltage: angle (b) Phasor voltage: magnitude
(c) Phasor current: magnitude
Figure 6.9: Phasor measurements under jamming attack. The red dotted line
corresponds to the unjammed GTNET PMU, while the blue solid line represents
the jammed Double High PMU. The phase angle difference is 21◦ which violates
th IEEE C37.118 standard for PMU measurements.
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(a) Phasor voltage: angle (b) Phasor voltage: angle
(c) Phasor voltage: magnitude (d) Phasor voltage: magnitude
(e) Phasor current: magnitude (f) Phasor current: magnitude
Figure 6.10: (a), (c), (e) denote measurements for the authentic case without
meaconing; (b), (d), (f) denotes the measurements for the case where one of the
PMU experiences external timing attacks. The IEEE C37.118 standard is
violated in phase angle measurements of (b) as compared to (a).
Meaconing
We introduced a meaconing signal with delay of 1000 µs as compared to the au-
thentic signal. The strength of the meaconing signal is varied and the Table. 6.2
shows the thresholds of various algorithms. We observe that the MR-DTE can
sustain 4.2 dB of higher powered meaconing signal followed by SR-DTE which
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sustains 2.01 dB and lastly PIAVT and scalar tracking which can sustain 1.4 dB
and 1 dB respectively. Fig. 6.10 shows the current, voltage and phase angles for
both cases. The plots on left shows the accurate synchronization between PMUs
under non-timing attack conditions whereas the plots on the right depicts the tim-
ing attack case where unsynchronized PMU data is observed with a phase angle
error of 20◦ thereby violating the IEEE C38.117 standard for synchrophasors.
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CHAPTER 7
SUMMARY AND FUTURE WORK
To summarize, we have proposed MR-DTE, a robust GPS algorithm to improve
the resiliency of the power grid against external timing attacks. We implement
DTE based signal processing technique. DTE directly correlates the incoming
GPS signal with the cumulative satellite signal replica for a pre-generated set of
clock candidates, and compute the maximum likelihood timing parameters.
MR-DTE utilizes multiple static receivers sharing a common clock. We lever-
age the geographical diversity and information redundancy of the multiple re-
ceivers to improve the inherent robustness of the system. Our multi-receiver pro-
tection scheme enables higher tolerance levels for WAMS thereby allowing con-
tinued operation in the presence of 17 dB of added jamming and meaconing attack
of 3 dB.
We designed a virtual power grid test platform using RTDS, USRP, PMU and a
commercial GPS clock to showcase the impacts of satellite broadcast data anoma-
lies, jamming and meaconing attacks. Through the emulated timing attacks to
the GPS signals collected, we demonstrated the increased resilience of MR-DTE
both at the GPS level by tracking the signal parameters correctly and at the power
grid level by analyzing the power grid stability. The results of these experiments
highlight the attack resilience of our proposed MR-DTE algorithms, while simul-
taneously maintaining GPS timing with accuracy that satisfies the IEEE C37.118
standards.
For future work, we propose to improve the robustness of PMUs against mea-
coning attack by incorporating new protective measures to our existing MR-DTE
platform. We plan to further design and develop a spoofer localization scheme to
counteract these attacks, thereby advancing the resiliency of power grids.
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